#1295

OPINION AND AWARD

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION BETWEEN Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, North Central Correctional Institution

-AND-

OCSEA/AFSCME, Local 11

APPEARANCES

For the State

Joseph P. Shaver, Chief Bureau of Labor Relations
Jerry Ballenger, Labor Relations, NCCI
Lou Kitchen, Labor Relations, NCCI
Sherri Duffy, Captain
Shiela Goodwin, Personnel Officer II
Melissa Rucker, StoreKeeper II
John Morgan, Warden
Margaret S. Lee, Deputy Warden

For the Union

Butch Wilie, Staff Representative
Pat Howell, Correction Officer
James Seckel, Correction Officer II
Daryl Slusher, Correction Officer II
Kevin Flake, Correction Officer
Ron Shambaugh, Correction Officer
Russell Castle, Grievant
Carla S. Black, Records Clerk
Case-Specific Data
Hearing Held

Grievance # 27-30-(7/9/97)-517-01-03

April 24, 1998

Case Decided June 14, 1998

Arbitrator: Robert Brookins, J.D., Ph.D. Subject: Termination

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I. Initial Facts

Virtually all of the allegations in this case are stoutly disputed. Therefore, instead of being presented at the outset of this opinion, most of the factual findings emerge throughout the subsequent discussion of the allegations.

Nevertheless, some initial facts are clear and will be set forth here. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction has employed Mr. Russell Castle (the Grievant) for approximately 10 years. He was intitially hired on August 24, 1987, as an Activity Therapist for the Madison Correctional Institution in London, Ohio, and was promoted to Correction Officer there on August 27, 1989. Then, as a Correction Officer, the Grievant transferred to the North Central Correctional Institution (NCCI) on November 11, 1994, where he remained until terminated on July 1, 1997, for violating two NCCI work rules.

II. The Issue

Was the Grievant, Russell Castle, removed for just cause? If not, what shall the remedy be?

III. Relevant Work Rules

Rule 6—insubordination—disobedience or inappropriate delay in carrying out a direct order of a supervisor.

Rule 13b—discrimination—sexual harassment.

IV. Position of the Parties Management's Position

- 1. The Grievant's failure to follow specific call-in instructions while on administrative leave constitutes insubordination.
- 2. The Grievant created a hostile work environment by sexually harassing Ms. Rucker with a continuing stream of unwelcomed sexual comments and suggestions.

Union's Position

- 1. The Grievant is not guilty of insubordination because he did not intentionally disobey his call-in instructions. He failed to call in as ordered because he misplaced the instructions and was otherwise confused.
- 2. The Grievant denies sexually harassing Ms. Rucker and lacked any knowledge of her allegations until the latter part of March 1997.

V. Discussion and Factual Findings

A. Insubordination

On April 11, 1997, NCCI placed the Grievant on administrative leave to investigate charges that he sexually harassed a female coworker. When placing him on administrative leave, NCCI specifically ordered the Grievant in writing: (1) to remain at home and available from 8:00 a.m to 4:00 p.m. Monday through Friday; and (2) to call in at 8:00 a.m. each work day for instructions from the First-shift Captain.¹

Nevertheless, the Grievant disobeyed these orders by failing to call in at all on April 14-17, 1997, and on May 1, 1997. During the hearing, the Grievant offered unrebutted testimony of the circumstances that caused him to miss the designated call-ins. He did not call in on April 14-16 because he became upset when NCCI placed him on leave; consequently, he misplaced the call-in orders. Also, he claimed that during this time, he was heavily medicated and consuming alcohol. This behavior contributed to his confusion about the call-in policy—he assumed the policy required him to call in every 2-3 days instead of every day. Eventually, Officer Flake informed the Grievant of his duty to call in every work day. The Grievant called in on April 17 but could not get through because the NCCI line was disconnected. He called in a second time on April 17, but a supervisor

Employer exhibit 2.

could not be located. Because he was calling long distance, the Grievant had Officer Scantlin to take his call-in. In an apparent attempt to substantiate this explanation, the Union offered Union Exhibit 2, a statement by Officer Scantlin, stating that in April 1997 Officer Scantlin received a telephone call from the Grievant. However, approximately 5 minutes elapsed before Officer Scantlin could reach the First-Shift Captain. By that time, the Grievant was no longer on the line. NCCI properly objected to Union Exhibit 2 as hearsay. Because the record lacks independent corroborating evidence to support the statement in Union Exhibit 2, the Arbitrator must discount its probative value. Moreover, on its face, the statement lacks probative value because rather than specifying the day the Grievant called in, Officer Scantlin merely declared that the Grievant called in on "April of 1997." Finally, on May 1, 1997, the Grievant again failed to call in because he was scheduled to attend an investigatory interview regarding the sexual harassment charges and reasoned that the interview somehow relieved him of his call-in duty.

Even though these explanations are unrebutted and presumed to be true, they do not excuse the Grievant's failure to call in as ordered. He must be held accountable for his actions in this instance. To excuse his dereliction of duty because he was upset or because he heightened the effects of medication by consuming alcohol is to create a loophole through which many, if not most, could skirt their duties with relative impunity. Moreover, even though he misplaced the written orders, it is reasonable and fair to charge him with constructive knowledge of those orders. Otherwise, NCCI may find it difficult to hold any employee responsible for even explicit, carefully drafted orders. Finally, as a Corrections Officer, the Grievant apparently gives orders to others while fully expecting his orders to be followed. Employees who hold such positions of authority are properly held to a higher standard of conduct, which includes a demonstrated ability to follow orders

themselves. Consequently, the Grievant's reasons for failing to follow explicit and direct orders might explain, but hardly justify, his conduct. Because the Grievant failed to follow direct orders and offered no acceptable reason for doing so, some discipline is warranted.

B. Sexual harassment

Ms. Melissa K. Rucker (Storekeeper II) claimed that the Grievant subjected her to a pattern of sexually harassing conduct for approximately 5-6 months. The first official record of that allegation was a report by an Equal Employment Opportunity Officer (Ms. Shiela A. Goodwin). Ms. Goodwin recorded the essence of her conversations with Ms. Rucker that occurred in March 1997 and on April 7, 1997. Also, on April 7, 1997, Ms. Rucker filed the first of two Incident Reports, alleging that the Grievant was sexually harassing her.² On April 11, 1997, she filed another Incident Report, again accusing the Grievant of sexual harassment. Also, on April 11, 1997, Warden John D. Morgan placed the Grievant on administrative leave pending a full investigation of Ms. Rucker's allegations.³

Captain Duffy conducted the investigation and obtained Ms. Rucker's statement during an interview on April 24, 1997 (Captain Duffy's Interview). ⁴ Captain Duffy also interviewed the Grievant, Sargent Slusher, OJT Hollen, Mr. Berry, Mrs. Majoros, as well as Officers Pryor, Ridenour, Seckel, and Shambaugh. On May 1, 1997, Captain Duffy submitted her report to Warden Morgan, who notified the Grievant, on May 15, 1997, that a pre-disciplinary conference would be held on May 22, 1997. On June 5, 1997, a hearing officer found the Grievant guilty of violating

Employer exhibit 5.

Employer exhibit 2.

Employer exhibit 1.

Rules 6 and 13b and, therefore, found just cause for discipline, which turned out to be discharge.⁵ The Union grieved the dismissal, on July 1, 1997; the parties were unable to settle it and ultimately presented it to the undersigned on April 24, 1998.

Because of the nature of their jobs, the Grievant and Ms. Rucker regularly encountered each other at work. Ms. Rucker drove a truck and made daily deliveries to an area where the Grievant was also assigned. Part of his responsibilities involved securing the steering wheel of Ms. Rucker's truck with a "Club" which fits across the steering wheel and locks it in one position, thereby defeating unauthorized use of the vehicle. Occasionally, the Grievant rode in the truck with Ms. Rucker. During the first 2-3 weeks, they engaged in ordinary conversation about their lives and jobs.

1. First Incident Report

This normal interaction was shattered during the 1996 Christmas season when the Grievant allegedly began making unwelcomed sexual comments and suggestions to Ms. Rucker. The hearing record reveals that on April 7, 1997, Ms. Rucker made the following allegations in her first Incident Report:

Over a period of four months, Officer Castle has repeatedly made unwanted comments to me in reference to my address, my appearance, my phone number, and our going on a date. At first, because I was on probation and did not want to cause unnecessary waves, I would laugh him off and walk away. As time progressed and he continued the unwanted comments I began to verbally let him know that I was uncomfortable.

On or about March 5, 1997, Co. Castle asked me, "What would be the chances that I could give you a small kiss on the cheek without you knocking me out." I replied, "None." At that time I advised C.O. Castle that he had gone too far.

Upon returning to the warehouse, I called Sheila Goodwin in Personnel. She gave me the paperwork to file an Informal Discrimination Complaint. She called me the next week to do a follow-up and I advised her that Castle had backed off.

After approximately one week, C.O. Castle began his advances again. This

Joint Exhibit 4.

time he was even bolder. I continued to try to avoid him by going into the Staff Dining Hall while my truck was being unloaded. I also began calling out the number on the club for the truck so he would not have to get in the truck with me. As a final attempt to avoid a bad situation, I asked him to step away from the truck until I got out.

Today after backing into the dock, I told C.O. Castle the club number that I had, which was "491." He (MAR) responded, "473-491, what is the last digit?" I responded don't you ever give up?" and walked away. About 5 minutes later he made a comment about my looks and compared it to the beautiful day. I gave him a dirty look and walked away. Standing at the back doors to Food Service, I began talking to Officer Shambaugh when Officer Castle walked over and started playing with my radio which was located in my left breast pocket. He reached across my body and brushed his arm across my breast. I told him to leave me alone and walked into Food Service. When I came back out, Officer Castle began to stare at me in a way that made me feel very uncomfortable. When I asked him why he was staring at me "that way", he told me because he could. Officer Shambaugh witnessed some of the situations.⁶

2. Second Incident Report

Sometime between April 4 and 11, 1997, Ms. Rucker filed an informal EEO complaint against the Grievant. On or about April 11, Ms. Rucker learned that the Grievant knew of the complaint, was upset, and planned to confront her about having filed it. On April 17, Ms. Rucker encountered the Grievant again and, on April 11, 1997, offered the following Incident Report which details her confrontation with him:

I went into to Food Service today to make my scheduled delivery. After parking in the dock, I placed the Club on the truck, got out and moved away from the truck so that Officer Castle could lock the club. I went to the back of the truck to get a box for the Pharmacy. When I went into Maintenance to call Mr. Cochran, Officer Castle followed me in and glared at me. I tried to ignore him. I walked out and met Mr. Cochran on the dock. Once again Officer Castle followed onto the dock and glared at me. Still attempting to ignore him I finished the paperwork with Mr. Cochran and went into the Staff Dining Room from there I went to Mrs. Buchanan's office where I spoke with Mrs. Buchanan and Mrs. Majoros about Officer Castle's actions. An inmate came to get me for a problem with the order on the truck. After

Emphasis added.

that situation was taken care of I stayed on the dock while Mr. Berry loaded steamers from Food Service. I noticed that Officer Castle was talking to Officer Shambaugh. I started talking and Officer Castle then came and stood between me and the Officer. When I saw Mrs. Buchanan, Mrs. Majoros and Mrs. Rush, I walked over and started speaking to them. After my truck was loaded, I unlocked the passenger side door for the rider. I then unlocked the driver side door and went to the front of the truck to wait for Officer Castle to unlock the truck and move away. He unlocked the truck and stood there. I waited a few minutes and went to get in the truck. Officer Castle grabbed the door and told me that he wanted to talk to me. I told him that I no longer wanted to talk to him and got in the truck. He then asked if I had filed an EEO complaint. I once again told him that I did not want to talk to him. He then told me that if I did file an EEO complaint that he could prove to me that I was a "Fucking Liar" I pulled the door shut, locked it, cranked up the truck and began to drive away. Officer Castle continued to yell, "You're a Fucking Liar."

3. Conflicting Statements by Ms. Rucker

In addition to her Incident Reports, Ms. Rucker offered two other statements—one in an interview with Captain Duffy (Captain Duffy's Interview) and her testimony during the arbitral hearing before the undersigned. During her interview with Captain Duffy, on April 24, 1997, Ms. Rucker recalled the following details. The italicized passages are most relevant here because none appears in her Incident Reports:

- 1. When she first started making deliveries in the truck, the Grievant "would jump up on the cab of the truck and place the club on the steering wheel, while she was sitting in the driver's seat."8
- 2. When the Grievant asked Ms. Rucker for a kiss, "[S]he informed him that he made her real uncomfortable, and she did not like that and she does not play that way. She states he asked her if that was his warning. She told him to take it for what it was worth. She states he again asked her if that was his warning, and she told him yes. Ms. Rucker states he said "fine, I won't say anything to you, I've been here before."

⁷ Emphasis added.

⁸ Employer exhibit 1 at 2.

In her incident Report of April 7, 1997, she gave the following account: "On or about March 5, 1997, Co. Castle asked me, "What would be the chances that I could give you a small

- 3. Matters so deteriorated that Officers Sambaugh and Ridenour offered "to take care of the truck so she could get away." 10
- 4. The Grievant allegedly brushed against her breast twice while attempting to play with her radio. According to her Incident Report, the brushing and reaching occurred but once. Moreover, she tried to stop him by making, "a slapping motion and told him to go away."
- 5. When she returned to her loaded truck, the Grievant was not simply staring at her but was "looking her up and down, as if he was undressing her with his eyes." 11
- 6. In addition to saying that he was looking at her because he could, the Grievant volunteered that, "She could do something about him touching or talking to her, but she could not do anything about him looking at her." 12
- 7. On April 11, 1997, Ms. Rucker made several—apparently superfluous—telephone calls in order to avoid confronting the Grievant who was standing around staring at her.
- 8. While Ms. Rucker was talking with OJT Hollen, Officer Sambaugh walked over and announced that the Grievant wanted to speak with her. ¹³ She refused and was "scared and nervous."
- 9. In addition to calling her a "fucking liar" at the scene by the truck, the Grievant actually "hit the truck," presumably with his hand.

When testifying before this Arbitrator, Ms. Rucker again included details that she omitted in her Incident Reports and/or interview with Captain Duffy. For example, during her testimony, she added or embellished the following events relative to her Incident Reports:

- 1. The Grievant offered to pick up a six-pack and come to her home and she *replied*, "Yeah, Right." When the Grievant offered to visit her and bring some video tapes, she asked if she should set an extra plate for her husband?
- 2. In her interview with Captain Duffy and in her Incident Reports, Ms. Rucker said she initially declined to file an informal EEO Complaint because the Grievant had "backed off" and because she was on probation.¹⁴ In contrast, she testified that she did not initially file the

kiss on the cheek without you knocking me out." I replied, "None." At that time I advised C.O. Castle that he had gone too far."

Employer exhibit at 3.

Employer exhibit 1 at 3.

¹² *Id*.

Employer exhibit 1 at 4.

Employer exhibit 1 at 3.

- Complaint because she knew the Grievant had experienced some problems in the mailroom, and she felt guilty about increasing his woes.
- 3. She testified for the first time that someone—presumably the Grievant—drew hearts on some boxes in the warehouse.
- 4. During the "Truck Scene," Ms. Rucker's Incident Report (4/11/98) mentions a third party only to the extent that she opened the passenger-side door of the truck for "the rider." She testified that OJT Dave Berry was in the rear of the truck when the Grievant called her a "Fucking liar." Subsequently, Mr. Berry alighted from the truck and asked "What the hell was that all about?"
 - a. During his interview with Captain Duffy, Mr. Berry testified that he heard the Grievant say "Liar" twice before he [the Grievant] rode away on his bicycle. Mr. Berry never mentioned either talking to or questioning Ms. Rucker about the incident.

These internal consistencies hardly enhance Ms. Rucker's credibility. For example, other matters equal, one would expect the Incident Reports to be the most thorough and accurate because Ms. Rucker recorded them on the day of the alleged events. Clearly that is not the case, however. Ms. Rucker's recall seemed to improve rather than dim over time, exactly the opposite of what one would reasonably expect.

4. "Radio Incident"—Mr. Shambaugh's Testimony

Although the inconsistencies adversely affect Ms. Rucker's credibility, the "Radio Incident" is even more problematic, not so much because of internal inconsistencies, but because of the substantial discrepancies between her three accounts—taken as a whole—and the testimony of Officer Shambaugh. First, Ms. Rucker acknowledges that Officer Shambaugh was present during the "Radio incident" and personally observed the Grievant's behavior. Nevertheless, her testimony conflicts with Officer Shambaugh's. Ms. Rucker stated that the Grievant approached her from her left, stood facing her, and reached across her body to manipulate the radio knobs. On the other hand,

Officer Shambaugh testified that the Grievant stood facing Ms. Rucker and almost squarely in front of her, not to her right. Officer Shambaugh also testified that the Grievant manipulated the knobs with his right hand. As demonstrated during the hearing, from that position, the Grievant—who is right handed—did not reach across Ms. Rucker's body. Therefore, he could not have brushed across Ms. Rucker's breasts as she alleged. Also, Officer Shambaugh neither saw nor heard Ms. Rucker say anything to the Grievant about touching the radio knobs. Nor did he observe Ms. Rucker making a slapping or pushing motion with her hands when the Grievant touched the radio knobs. Officer Shambaugh stood approximately 4 feet from Ms. Rucker and the Grievant and to her left. From there, he commanded an almost perfect view of her chest, the Grievant's hands, and the radio knobs.

Although it does not independently discredit Ms. Rucker, the discrepancy between her and Officer Shambaugh's testimony deeply concerns the Arbitrator. This testimonial conflict is crucial for several reasons. First, the resolution of this dispute turns almost entirely on Ms. Rucker's and the Grievant's credibility. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Ms. Rucker—and not the Grievant—has the burden of proving hostile environment sexual harassment. If the evidence in the record as a whole is equivocal as to the alleged sexually harassment, then the Grievance must be sustained on that particular charge.

Second, given the substantial stigma attached to a charge of sexual harassment and the likely damage to the life and reputation of anyone found guilty of such misconduct, an alleged victim should—and in this instance must—prove sexual harassment by clear and convincing evidence rather than by the usual preponderance of the evidence.¹⁶

The Union asked for a "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" standard. However, the Arbitrator believes that the "Clear and Convincing" standard assures that doubts are adequately resolved in the favor of the accused and, thus, adequately diminishes the risk that the accused

Third, and most important, the "Radio Incident" is one of two incidents that third parties witnessed and, thus, is not simply a matter of Ms. Rucker's word against the Grievant's. Substantial and relevant segments of Ms. Rucker's account were refuted by Officer Shambaugh, who had a closer relationship with Ms. Rucker than with the Grievant. ¹⁷ This refutation diminishes Ms. Rucker's credibility regarding both the "Radio incident" and other alleged incidents. Comparing Officer Shambaugh's account with Ms. Rucker's reveals that she seems to have exaggerated certain aspects of the Grievant's behavior, such as whether he brushed against her breast, how she responded to his manipulating the radio knobs, and where he stood when he reached for the radio knobs. Clearly, these discrepancies cause concern about the extent to which she exaggerated the Grievant's behavior in the unwitnessed episodes of their interactions.

In addition, at least two reasons suggest that Officer Shambaugh is more credible in the "Radio Incident." First, neither reason nor evidence in the record suggests that he had anything to gain from misrepresentations. Second, Officer Shambaugh showed no signs of favoritism inasmuch as he also contradicted the Grievant's claim that the Grievant never called Ms. Rucker a "Fucking liar."¹⁸

This is not to suggest that the Grievant's account is wholly credible. He denies having made any sexual comments to Ms. Rucker. He admits only to carrying on normal conversations with her

will be wrongfully disciplined for sexual harassment.

The other refutation came from the statement of Mr. Berry who was present when the Grievant allegedly called Ms. Rucker a "Fucking liar." Still, Mr. Berry only heard the Grievant say "Liar."

See note 19 and accompanying text for more discussion of the Grievant's claim in this respect.

and agreeing to accompany her to a dinner she won at the Red Lobster restaurant. The Grievant claims he was unaware of Ms. Rucker's allegations until he heard them through rumors. With respect to the "Radio incident," the Grievant offered the following account: earlier on April 11, Ms. Rucker attempted to contact the Grievant on her radio. She tried to contact him on 3 or 4 occasions, and he apparently responded each time, but apparently she did not hear him. Later, when he saw her on the loading dock, he noticed that the volume on her radio was turned completely off. So he walked over, turned it up once, and then left. Nonetheless, relative to Ms. Rucker's version of this particular event, the Grievant's is more compatible with Officer Shambaugh's. Finally, the Grievant also denies having called Ms. Rucker a "Fucking liar." He says he called her a "Damn liar." In effect, the Grievant denies taking any impermissible actions toward Ms. Rucker. This too is an incredible account. The difference is that NCCI—and not the Grievant—has the burden of proof in this dispute, a burden that NCCI simply cannot satisfy with a credibility cloud hanging over its chief witness—Ms. Rucker.

The Arbitrator does not mean to suggest that nothing occurred between the Grievant and Ms. Rucker. Other factors in the record—such as the detailed nature of Ms. Rucker's recollections—establish that something did occur between the Ms. Rucker and the Grievant. Still, at some point, the credibility that detailed accounts generate must yield to internal inconsistencies and external refutations by eye witnesses. Even though something happened between Ms. Rucker and the Grievant, evidence in the record as a whole does not clearly and convincingly indicate what that something was.

Observe also that Mr. Berry testified that he only heard the Grievant call Ms. Rucker a "liar."

Because the basic facts which NCCI views as constituting sexual harassment have not been established, there is no need to venture into an analysis and application of the substantive rules that govern sexual harassment. Accordingly, the Arbitrator will dispense with that portion of the opinion in this case.

IV. The Remedy

As mentioned above, the Grievant's failure to call in as specifically and clearly directed constitutes insubordination and justifies the imposition of some disciplinary measure. In assessing that quantum of discipline, one must balance mitigating factors against aggravating factors. Mitigating factors include the Grievant's ten-year tenure with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and NCCI. In addition, he has apparently performed his job reasonably well during this period.

The major aggravating factors include the Grievant's disciplinary record and the seriousness of his insubordinate behavior. Excluding the present termination, the Grievant has been disciplined four times in four years; two of those four disciplinary measures were taken in 1996. On November 17, 1992, he received a 5-day suspension for insubordination and failure of good behavior. NCCI suspended him again on June 6, 1994, for insubordination and failure to follow post orders, administrative regulations and/or written procedures. Again on February 7, 1996, the Grievant received a written reprimand for being AWOL and leaving his work area without permission. Finally, on September 16, 1996, he received 3-day suspension for making obscene gestures or statements or false or abusive statements towards other employees and for sexually harassing fellow employees.

The Grievant seems resistant to the rehabilitative force of progressive discipline. Indeed,

the *only* reason the Arbitrator refrains from sustaining his termination is that NCCI did not prove half of its case. Moreover, NCCI apparently based its decision to terminate the Grievant on both charges—insubordination and sexual harassment—rather than on either charge individually. Indeed, NCCI did not contend that the insubordination charge alone warranted the discharge. Even so, the Grievant's disciplinary record together with proof of insubordination clearly warrants serious discipline in a last-ditch effort to rehabilitate him.

The Grievant desperately needs to recognize that he is treading on the thinnest of ice and that in all likelihood there will be no more "chances." With these factors in mind, the Arbitrator imposes the following disciplinary measure: (1) The termination shall be reduced to the *maximum suspension* (without pay) that NCCI may impose pursuant to its table of penalties and the contracts; (2) except for the back pay lost during this suspension, the Grievant shall receive all back pay to which he is entitled; (3) The Grievant's seniority is to remain in tact; (4) If the Grievant engages in any misconduct prohibited by the contract or NCCI's work rules within one calendar year from the date that he returns to work, NCCI shall be relieved of this Arbitrator's reinstatement order and may summarily terminate the Grievant.

The Arbitrator retains jurisdiction of this matter should the parties have any questions or concerns about the implementation of this remedy. For all the foregoing reasons, the Grievance is **SUSTAINED** in part and **DENIED** in part.

Notary Certificate
State of Indiana)
)SS:
County of Marion
Before me the undersigned, Notary Public for Marion County, State of
Indiana, personally appeared ROBET BYOKINS, and acknowledged the
execution of this instrument this 23° day of 3° day of 3° , 1998
Signature of Notary Public: Shanmin Holloway
Printed Name of Notary Public: Shannon Halloway
My commission expires: 15/2008
County of Residency:

Robert Brookins

Robert Brooking